{"id":241633,"date":"2020-01-17T12:03:00","date_gmt":"2020-01-17T12:03:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.b-c-training.com\/?post_type=bulletin&p=241633"},"modified":"2022-11-15T12:06:10","modified_gmt":"2022-11-15T12:06:10","slug":"the-case-against-situational-crisis-communication-theory","status":"publish","type":"bulletin","link":"https:\/\/www.b-c-training.com\/bulletin\/the-case-against-situational-crisis-communication-theory\/","title":{"rendered":"The Case Against Situational Crisis Communication Theory"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Following Charlie’s previous bulletin\u00a0‘Crisis communications, a dark art?’<\/a>\u00a0about how you can develop a crisis response strategy from Timothy Coombs’ Situational Crisis Communications Theory (SCCT), this week’s guest author\u00a0Jim Preen<\/a>\u00a0makes his case against SCCT.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2007 WT Coombs posited a crisis communication theory known as SCCT. It was an attempt to categorise the different types of reputational crises that an organisation might face and couple them with a process for dealing with each particular threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Coombs identified three types of crisis clusters: The victim cluster, the accidental cluster and the intentional cluster.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Victim Cluster<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Victim clusters are events that an organisation is not responsible for, for instance natural disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes. Presumably this could also include a terror attack that takes place close to a firm\u2019s place of business.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Coombs claims these types of crises present \u2018only a mild reputational threat\u2019 to an organisation because they can\u2019t be held responsible and are sometimes themselves a victim of the incident.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Problem #1<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is demonstrably wrong. Unfortunately, as we saw with the Grenfell fire in London, the emergency services, particularly the fire service, were roundly criticised for their response to the blaze which was hampered by failings in fire service protocols. Obviously, the fire service was not to blame for fire, but they were hammered in Sir Martin Moore-Bick\u2019s report particularly for their failure to evacuate the building once it was clear the fire was out of control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The report also castigated the fire service for communication failings. Control room operators (CROs) must stay on the line with callers at risk from a fire, but the number of callers at Grenfell far exceeded the number of CROs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

CROs were also criticised for not logging crucial information from callers and communication between the control room and the incident commander on the ground was also found to be poor. At one point, CROs told occupants the fire was confined to the 4th floor when it had in fact reached the top floor of the tower.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As to a terror attack, a firm can\u2019t be held responsible for the incident, but may well be held to account for an unfocused or dilatory response, particularly if staff and other stakeholders are put at risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Accidental Clusters<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Coombs identifies accidental clusters or crises as \u2018organisational actions leading to the crisis (which) were unintentional\u2019. These are seen as a \u2018moderate reputational threat\u2019. Presumably the accidental cluster would include the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 phone bursting into flames.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Problem #2<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Samsung didn\u2019t mean for their phones to catch fire, but the idea that this disaster, which triggered the biggest product recall in corporate history, only caused a moderate threat to Samsung is laughable. Samsung\u2019s communications were guarded and slow and stakeholders were told of \u2018heat damage issues\u2019, that left customers unclear whether any Samsung devices were safe. They also branded what was clearly a \u2018product recall\u2019 an \u2018exchange\u2019, creating further confusion. Samsung has since recovered, but at the time many commentators saw this crisis as an existential threat to the South Korean giant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Intentional Clusters<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Intentional clusters are where an organisation knowingly places people at risk, takes inappropriate actions or violates laws and regulations. If your firm or your people are to blame for a crisis particularly when people have been hurt or have died, then the result will inevitably represent \u2018a severe reputational threat\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An example of an intentional cluster would be Volkswagen fitting \u2018defeat devices\u2019 to their cars to falsify emissions data. Despite assertions to the contrary it seems that the devices were fitted intentionally with the full knowledge of senior executives; they just didn\u2019t intend to be found out. This story bears further investigation and we will return to it shortly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I don\u2019t have a problem trying to place crises into groups of severity, but I\u2019m not sure it\u2019s particularly helpful. Crises are slippery items that often defy categories or else slip through the cracks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A much bigger problem with SCCT can be found when we look at the Crisis Response Strategies that Coombs formulated to overcome the clustered crises. I\u2019ve seen these framed in various different groups. Here\u2019s an example:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Non-existence Strategies<\/h2>\n\n\n\n